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DIRECT CITY LEGISLATION ON
FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS
EDWIN CONRAD*
"In every man's writings, the
character of the writer must
be recorded." Thomas Carlyle
I. THE ANCIENT CITY STATES AND FOREIGN POLICY
The city state is as old as antiquity. The powerful ancient city states
of Thebes, Babylon, Athens, Sparta and Rome are classic examples of
the tremendous power possessed by these city states.1 At one time the
Roman Senate, representing the City of Rome, determined foreign
policy matters for the entire ancient world, including the Roman Repub-
lic and its allies (socii) and later the vast Roman Principate Empire.2
As one of the terms of the peace treaty following the Second Punic
Wars (218-201 B.C.), Carthage was forbidden to declare war on any
country without the consent of the Roman Senate. Historically, there-
fore, it is quite appropriate to note that the determination of foreign
policy matters by city states has very ancient roots.
With the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1787, foreign
policy matters of the United States fell within the domain of the Presi-
dent and the Congress. Under the Constitution of the United States,
only Congress can declare war.4 However, the President, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, is empowered to enter into treaties in-
volving foreign policy.5 But this very delicate balance between the
executive and the legislative branches is complicated to a great extent
by the tremendous powers which the President of the United States has
as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.6 By virtue
of this awesome power, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
the President of the United States can virtually commit this country to
a state of war without the consent of Congress.
* City Attorney, Madison, Wisconsin, B.A., 1932, J.D., 1934, M.A., 1938 Univer-
sity of Wisconsin. New York University Summer School, Vanderbilt School
of Law, 1959, Lecturer in Law, University of Wisconsin, School of Law,
1954-1960. Professor of Law, College of Law, Syracuse University, 1958-
1960. Member New York and Wisconsin Bars. Author, "Modern Trial Evi-
dence", "Wisconsin Evidence", and numerous articles in the field of law and
scientific evidence. Member, American Law Institute; Fellow, American Aca-
demy of Forensic Sciences.
lSee HALLIDAY, W. R., THE GROWTH OF THE CITY STATES, (Argonaut, Chicago,
1967).
2 See MOMMSEN, C. M., THE HISTORY OF ROME, (Scribner's Sons, N.Y. 1887).
3 See BOAK, E. R., SINNIGEN, W. G., A HISTORY OF ROME TO 565 A.D., (Macmil-
lan, N.Y., 1965) 122.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
7 This is the burning issue of the day. See National Commitments, S. Doc.
797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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Within the framework of the United States Constitution, the States
as such have no voice in foreign policy determinations except through
their duly elected representatives, although such decisions may seriously
affect them. Since the cities are creatures of the state, these same ob-
servations must apply to municipalities in general.
It is quite conceivable that this situation may change by virtue of
historical and sociological pressures. If the prognostications of the
sociologists are correct, the United States of 2000 A.D. may consist
of six major strip cities running north and south from Canada to the
southernmost portions of the United States. Two of such major strip
cities are already evident on the Atlantic and Pacific coast lines and
another major one, on a line through Chicago, is now in a state of
metamorphosis. This realignment of the major cities of the United
States may once again resurrect the power of the cities.
Recent historical events have raised the provocative question of
what power the cities may exercise with respect to foreign policy
matters. Shall they be denied any voice in this area? These same oc-
currences have also raised questions as to whether the electors of
a city may have a direct voice in the foreign policy area by utilizing
the procedure of direct legislation or initiative and referendum.
II. DIRECT LEGISLATION BY CITIES
It is correct to say that generally common councils of cities deter-
mine legislative matters within their respective jurisdictions and that
only the common council representatives chosen by the people, and not
the people themselves, enact legislation for the cities. Thus the cities
are governed by a representative or republican form of government.
Cities, therefore, are not run as pure democracies.
A number of states have reserved certain powers which may be
exercised by the people through proceedings designated as either direct
legislation or initiative and referendum. Thus, under Section 9.20 of
the Wisconsin Statutess a number of electors equal to at least 15 percent
of the votes cast for governor at the last general election in their city,
may sign and file with the city clerk a petition requesting "that an at-
tached proposed ordinance or resolution, without alteration, either be
adopted by the common council or be referred to a vote of the electors."
[emphasis added] Since this paper deals with the subject matter of
the ordinance or resolution, no attempt will be made to outline the
procedural details involved. However, one should direct attention to
the provisions that such ordinance or resolution is not subject to the
veto power of the mayor and cannot be repealed or amended within
two years of its adoption except by a vote of the electors.
8 Section 9.20 was formerly § 10.43 and was created by ch. 666, laws of 1965,
effective July 1, 1967. While a few changes are to be noted, essentially § 9.20
is a restatement of § 10.43, which was generated by ch. 513, Laws of 1911.
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The justification, for direct legislation or initiative and referendum
statutes is succinctly stated in Spencer v. City of Alhambra9 from which
the following is taken:
It is a basic principle inherent in the American system of repre-
sentative government . . . that 'all political power is inherent in
the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security,
and benefit of the people, and they have the right to alter or
reform the same whenever the public good may require it.'
From the foregoing, it follows that the legislative power of the
municipality resides in the people thereof. By writing into the
charter, initiative and referendum laws, the people of the city
have simply withdrawn from the legislative body and reserved
to themselves the right to exercise a part of their inherent politi-
cal power.10
III. IMPLIED EXCEPTIONS TO
WISCONSIN DIRECT LEGISLATION STATUTES
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been too liberal in its inter-
pretation of Section 9.20. The court's holding that the statute applies
only to cities and not to counties is quite in conformity with the lan-
guage of the present law." But despite Justice Fowler's admonition in
Feavel v. Appleton 12 that the Law makes no exceptions of subjects to
which it applies, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has construed Section
9.20 quite strictly and has tacked onto the statute many implied excep-
tions. Under various interpretations, it has held that:
(1) Direct legislation changing the salaries of aldermen after the
first regular meeting in February, the last date that a common council
could act to increase its salaries for a new term, was in contravention of
Section 62.09(6) and was therefore invalid.' 3
(2) If a statute prescribes a certain procedure, such as in the ac-
quisition of, or additions to a utility under Section 66.066, the electors
and so forth of a city may not demand the submission of a question
which will modify the statutory authority.' 4
(3) In initiative and referendum proceedings, city electors may
9 Spencer et al. v. City of Alhambra et al., 44 Cal. App. 2d 75, 111 P.2d 910
(1941).
10 Id. at 77, 111 P.2d at 912.
"1 Marshall v. Dane County Board of Supervisers, 236 Wis. 57, 294 N.W. 496
(1940). At one time counties were included: Meade v. Dane County, 155 Wis.
632, 145 N.W. 239 (1914). However, in 1939 the Attorney General asserted
that the equivalent of § 10.43 could not constitutionally be applied to counties,
28 Op. Att'y. Gen. 719 (1939). The position of the Attorney General was
sustained in Marshall v. Dane County, 236 Wis. 57, 294 N.W. 496 (1940);
and § 59.02(2) was repealed by ch. 177, Laws of 1943.
12 Feavel v. City of Appleton, 234 Wis. 483, 494, 291 N.W. 830, 835 (1940). Id. at
494, 291 N.W. at 835 for dissent on this point by Justice Fowler.
13 Feavel v. City of Appleton, 234 Wis. 483, 291 N.W. 830 (1940).
14 Heider v. Common Council of City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 155 N.W.2d
17 (1967) ; Denning v. Green Bay, 271 Wis. 230, 72 N.W.2d 30 (1955) ; Flot-
turn v. Cumberland, 234 Wis. 654, 291 N.W. 777 (1940) ; Henderson v. Hoesley,
225 Wis. 596, 275 N.W. 443 (1937).
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exercise only such powers as are conferred upon the common council
of the city.'5
(4) Existing legislation cannot be substantially amended or repealed
by direct legislation, so as to, in effect, nullify the previous enactment.'6
(5) The power of initiative or referendum is usually restricted to
legislative ordinances, resolutions, or measures and is not extended to
executive or administrative action.'7
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has tolled the bells for City Home
Rule.' The many implied exceptions which it has attached to Section
9.20 are highly debatable and have weakened the initiative and referen-
dum procedures in cities which may use them. Nevertheless, the court
has never been confronted with the question whether direct legislation
may include foreign policy matters, so we will have to look elsewhere
for positive and definitive answers to this question.
IV. THE RISING IMPORTANCE TO CITIES OF
FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINATIONS
Cities have not until recently been concerned with foreign policy
matters. The heavy cost of a large scale war has brought upon the
people of the cities the sudden realization that the siphoning of money
to the war areas, the blight of the cities, and the drain of federal funds
away from the urban areas have caused real municipal problems. There-
fore, certain groups have 'been using direct legislation to admonish the
government of the United States to end its war in Southeast Asia. For
example, in Madison, Wisconsin the required number of petitioners
presented to the Common Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section
9.20, the following resolution:
Now Therefore, Be it Resolved that the Common Council of
the City of Madison hereby refers the following question to the
City electorate at the Spring Election on April 2, 1968:
It is the policy of the people of the City of Madison that
there be an immediate cease fire and the withdrawal of
United States troops from Vietnam, so that Vietnamese
people can determine their own destiny.
As a matter of historical interest, the adoption of the resolution was
placed upon the April 2, 1968 ballot and was defeated.
15 Feavel v. City of Appleton, 234 Wis. 483, 291 N.W. 830 (1940).
16 Heider v. Common Council of City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 155
N.W.2d 17 (1967); Landt v. Wisconsin Dells, 30 Wis. 2d 470, 141 N.W.2d
245 (1966). Town of Wilson v. Sheboygan, 230 Wis. 483, 283 N.W. 312
(1939). Whether an existing ordinance may be amended by initiative pro-
cedure has not been directly decided. Heider v. Common Council of the City
of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 155 N.W.2d 17 (1967).
1 Heider v. Common Council of City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 155 N.W.2d
17 (1967).
The distinction between legislative and administrative matters in municipal
affairs is of extreme complexity. We will not pursue this issue in view of
the nature of the subject matter of this article.
'8 WIs. STATS. § 66.01 (1965).
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Two questions were raised by the presentation of this resolution:
(1) Did the common council of the City of Madison have the power
on its own initiative to adopt such a resolution?
(2) Was the resolution within the purview of Section 9.20?
In approaching the answers to these problems, one must bear in
mind that the Wisconsin cases are silent on the subject matter, that
direct legislation statutes elsewhere vary greatly as to content, and that
there is very little authority to be found involving specific discussion
of the problems raised. It would be quite simple to evade the issues,
but a lawyer would not fulfill his moral obligation as a professional per-
son if he did not attempt to do his best to answer the questions raised.
V. THE CALIFORNIA RULE
Fortunately, the leading case on this subject is Farley v. Healey19
in which the court discussed the City and County of San Francisco
charter, Section 179, which provided for direct legislation by the people
and which contained the following clause: "Any declaration of policy
may be submitted to the electors in the manner provided for the sub-
mission of ordinances." When such policy was approved by the people,
it was the duty of the board of supervisors to carry such policies or
principles into effect. The board likewise must have had the power to
enact any such ordinance or act and to adopt any other measure covered
by the charter of the City and County of San Francisco. Petitioners'
right to have an initiative measure urging an immediate cease fire and
withdrawal from Vietnam20 placed on the City-County ballot was up-
held by the Supreme Court of California on the following grounds:
(1) The power of initiative must be liberally construed to promote
the democratic process.
(2) The subject matter of the proposal was within the purview of
the charter.
(3) One of the purposes of local government is to represent its
citizens before the Congress, the legislature, and administrative
agencies in matters over which the local government has no
power in order to produce a desired effect.
(4) Traditionally it is common for local legislative bodies to make
their positions known on matters of foreign policy and other
matters affecting them even though such declarations of policy
have no binding effect elsewhere.
(5) The language of the charter of the City and County of San
Francisco was broad enough to include a foreign policy de-
termination on the Vietnam war issue.
19 Farley v. Healey, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26, 431 P.2d 650 (1967). Chief Justice Tray-
nor and Associate Justices Peters, Tobriner, Mosk and Sullivan filed the
majority opinion. Justices Burke and McComb entered vigorous dissents.
20 Id. It is to be noted that the question in the Farley case is identical to that
submitted to the City of Madison electorate.
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(6) The board of supervisors itself could enact such measure as
an avenue of advocacy available to express its will.
(7) The board could hire a Washington lobbyist to make the peo-
ple's position known to Congress on all matters affecting the
City and County of San Francisco including foreign policy
of the United States.
(8) The measure on Vietnam concerned itself with municipal af-
fairs on which the board could enact binding legislation, as far
as the board itself was concerned.
(9) A local position on foreign policy matters is within the powers
of the board and within the powers of the people through the
process of initiative and referendum.
VI. THE OIHIO AND NEW YoRK, RULES
An identical Vietnam question was kept off the ballot of the Village
of Willoughby Hills, Ohio by the Supreme Court of Ohio on the ground
that the subject matter of the resolution did not fall within the powers
of local government under the Ohio Constitution.21 It should be noted
that the opinion is per curiam, a device used frequently by the judicial
bodies to avoid individual exposure of the justices on highly contro-
versial matters. While the court is to be complimented for its extreme
brevity at a time when the American system of law may fall by the
weight of its own law books, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision will
never become a landmark in American legal history.
The New York rule as stated in Silberman v. Katz22 considered the
question of Vietnam and initiative and referendum in a rather unique
way. Instead of placing the anti-Vietnam question directly on the ballot,
petitioners in that case sought to place before the electorate the question
of creating a new municipal office to be known as the "Anti-Vietnam
War Coordinator," whose duties in effect were directed at ending the
war in Vietnam. The Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, New
York County, while admitting that United States policy in Southeast
Asia and this Country's participation in the Vietnam war was of utmost
concern to citizens of the City of New York, nevertheless refused to
place such a question on the ballot for the following major reasons:
(1) Initiative and referendum proceedings may not be utilized on
matters strictly national or international in character.
(2) The New York City Charter provisions pertaining to initiative
and referendum can only be used to effectuate changes, altera-
tions or modifications of the local government's functions.
(3) Such charter does not provide for a referendum to declare
21 State ex rel Rhodes v. Board of Elections of Lake County, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4,
230 N.E.2d 347 (1967), construing OHIO CONST. art. II, § if.22 In Re Silberman v. Katz, 54 Misc. 2d 956, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct., Spec. T.
1967), affd. without opinion 28 App. Div. 2d 992, 284 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967).
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policy-language for which was specifically included in the
charter of the City and County of San Francisco.
(4) New York City electors did not contemplate the establishment
of the office of a federal lobbyist on every aspect of federal
action not affecting New York City when they adopted the
charter law.
(5) The creation of the office in question was a device to circum-
vent the New York City charter law.
(6) Foreign policy is clearly beyond the powers of municipal gov-
ernment and should be handled through Congress or the Presi-
dent or both.
(7) Public polls on foreign policy matters at taxpayers' expense
are not within the purview of the New York City charter law.
(8) The distinctiveness and exclusive jurisdictions of the City,
State and Federal Governments cannot be merged by tortured
reasoning or by an abandonment of basic principles.
In all fairness it should be pointed out that the Supreme Court Special
Term, New York County is a trial court whose decision was affirmed
without opinion by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First De-
partment, an intermediate court of appeals. The highest court, the Court
of Appeals of New York, has not yet spoken on the subject. It is also
in order to observe that in the New York City charter the provisions
on initiative are not similar to those found in the statute books of other
states. These considerations, therefore, must weaken the effect of the
holding in the principal New York case here involved.
VII. AN EVALUATION OF POSITIONS
What the Wisconsin Supreme Court would do if the question were
presented to it at this time cannot, of course, be predicted. From an
overall analysis of the cases, it would seem that the California position
is the soundest in legal theory. Section 9.20, while omitting any language
relating to policy questions, nevertheless includes the phrase "any reso-
lution or ordinance," and in this sense more closely approximates the
charter of the City and County of San Francisco than does the initiative
and referendum laws of Ohio or New York. It would be wise to heed
the warning of Justice Fowler of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that
the present Section 9.20, formerly Section 10.43, "contains no exceptions
of subjects to which it applies. '23
It is axiomatic that all initiative and referendum statutes should be
liberally construed so as to promote the democratic process. In 1628,
Sir Edward Coke was successful in having Charles I recognize the
23 See dissenting opinion of Justice Fowler in Feavel v. Appleton, 234 Wis. 483,
493, 291 N.W. 830, 835 (1940). Initiative and referendum proceedings are
applied to all ordinances and resolutions. Meade v. Dane County, 155 Wis. 632,
145 N.W. 239 (1914).
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Great Petition of Right24 whereby any aggrieved person was entitled
as a matter of right to petition his government for the redress of his
grievance. This Great Petition of Right was incorporated both into the
United States25 and Wisconsin 26 Constitutions.
It is unrealistic to argue today that the foreign policy of the United
States is of no direct immediate concern to the cities. In this chromium
civilization, what happens in Washington is of vital concern to every
city and what happens to the rest of the world has a direct bearing
upon our own civic affairs.
This is best exemplified by the Poet John Donne, in his Meditation
XVII, the theme for Ernest Hemingway's, For Whom the Bell Tolls:
No man is an island, entire by itself; every man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by
the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontary were,
• . . any man's death diminishes me because I am involved in
mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell
tolls; it tolls for thee.
Foreign and municipal affairs are now so intertwined that no longer
can one area be separated from the other. It will not be possible to still
the voice of the cities (vox municipiorium) in foreign affairs and for
these various reasons, the California decision now symbolizes a new
hallmark of law, justice, and equity.
24 Lord Coke himself stated that the words of the petition "were worthy to be
written in letters of gold." See COKE, FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTE (W.
Lee and D. Pakeman, ed., London, 1648) 21; BowEN, THE LION AND THE
THRONE, (Boston, Little, Brown, 1957) 483-502, 521.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 WIs. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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